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Beholden to the Bear: The Political
Economy of European Natural Gas Trade 
with Russia
Jessica Miltenberger 
Background & Existing Literature
While oil has been perceived as political since the oil shocks of the 1970s, natural gas is 
a relatively new political commodity1. In fact, it had almost no role in the European energy 
market until large domestic reserves were discovered in the United Kingdom and the Neth-
erlands in the 1950s and 1960s2. Since then, natural gas has burgeoned into what is arguably 
the most important energy commodity in Europe. In the EU, where 62.8% of natural gas 
is used for personal and home use3, electricity and heat are almost synonymous with gas. As 
the dozen people who froze to death as a result of the January 2009 gas dispute4 learned, 
electricity and heat—and by inference natural gas—mean life. 
The January 2009 incident was an almost-perfect echo of what occurred in January 
of 2006, and again in March of 2008, when Russian-administered gas company Gazprom 
drastically cut natural gas supplies to the Ukraine—through which all but one of the gas 
pipelines to Europe must pass—as the result of a dispute over payment of a contract. In the 
case of 2008, this action caused natural gas exports to parts of the EU to drop by as much 
as 40%5. That August, following the Russian invasion of Georgia, the European Union 
admitted that it could not realistically impose economic sanctions on Russia since the EU 
is dependent upon the former for approximately 30% of its oil and almost 50% of its natural 
1 Delvaux, B., Hunt, M., & Talus, K. (2008). EU Energy Law and Policy Issues: The Energy Law Research Forum Collec-
tion. Lanham, MD: Bernan Press(Pa). pp 131
2 Eurostat. Gas and Electricity Market Statistics with CD-ROM. 2007 ed. Belgium: European Communities, 2007. 
pp 36
3 Eurostat. Gas and Electricity Market Statistics with CD-ROM. 2007 ed. Belgium: European Communities, 2007. 
pp 37
4 Kramer, A. E.. (2009, January 18). Russia and Ukraine Reach Deal on Gas. The New York Times. Retrieved No-
vember 5, 2009, from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/19/world/europe/19gazprom.html.
5 Gazprom restores Ukraine gas flow. (2008, March 5). BBC NEWS. Retrieved September 28, 2008, from http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7276589.stm
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gas6 7. This political ramification of a seemingly economic discrepancy begins to illustrate 
why a purely economic approach to EU energy security is insufficient to explain the puzzle.
If states truly were unitary actors driven to maximize utility through trade, one would 
expect to see EU member states choosing their primary gas supplier based on whatever 
source has the cheapest price. While it is true that much of the EU remains dependent on 
Russia due to their ability to supply the cheapest natural gas, this does not explain why we 
see some states making the pointed choice to adopt more expensive energy sources in an 
effort to diversify away from Russia. That is because a simple supply and demand model 
fails to take into account the basic drive of states to maximize security through trade. Gowa 
and Mansfield’s model of power politics and international trade points out that trade “en-
hances the potential military power of any country that engages in it,” and moreover, “trade 
with an adversary produces a security diseconomy; trade with an ally produces a positive 
externality.”8 
This idea may better explain why states like Lithuania9 and Hungary10 are willing to 
pay a higher price for diversification despite the economic hardship it would create, in order 
to balance their security through trade. However, it is a mistake to think that natural gas is 
a purely economic commodity with a security dimension—rather, it should be considered a 
security commodity with an economic dimension. The necessity of natural gas in maintain-
ing the civilized world is such that a break in its supply is enough to cause chaos and even 
threaten lives, as it did during the gas cutoffs in the winters of 2006, 2008 and 2009.
Some authors argue that European energy security can only be successfully addressed 
from the supranational level of the European Union. Indeed, it is on this proposed solu-
tion that the EU itself focuses. However, the EU-centric option has shown its ineffective-
ness time and again when is comes to addressing Russia’s energy dominance, and simple 
domestic discrepancies in energy policy have served to stall the entire dialogue, such as the 
unwillingness of states to invest in a shared energy infrastructure. By choosing instead to 
unilaterally make deals with Russia (as Germany has) or protect domestic energy indus-
try from supranational regulation (as France has) the greatest players within the European 
Union are demonstrating that energy security is an issue firmly in the domestic political 
domain, as well as the economic.
Moreover, in order to engage the cumbersome gears of the EU, every move by the 
6 Russia Cool on EU Energy Deregulation. (2007, October 25). The Moscow News. Retrieved November 23, 2008 
from http://www.mnweekly.ru/business/20071025/55285360.html.
7 See also: Roberts, pg. 49, Hadfield, pg. 232
8 Gowa, J. and Mansfield, E. D. (1993, June) “Power Politics and International Trade,” American Political Science 
Review, 87(2)., pp. 408.
9 The closing of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (INPP) on Dec. 31st, 2009 (per Lithuania’s accession agreement 
with the European Union in 2004) means a more than doubling of electricity prices, and an energy deficit forcing it 
to look at using gas bought from Russia. Energy imports from Russia are expected to rise to 45% of total consump-
tion over the next year. (http://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/21908/) Lithuania’s government is currently 
appealing to the EU for funding to build thousands of wind turbines in an effort to stave off a more permanent 
dependence on Russia.
10 Hungary relies on imports for over half of its primary energy requirements.  Domestic natural gas reserves are 
almost gone, and demand for natural gas in Hungary is expected to increase by about 20% over the next 10 years, 
over which period domestic production will fall by some 30%. (http://www.ecee.org/pubs/hungary.htm#energy) 
In March of 2009, a Russian energy group purchased an Austrian company’s share of Hungary’s largest energy com-
pany—MOL—for its twice market value, thus securing a large voice in Hungarian energy production and imports. 
(http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2009/03/30/54170/russia-invades-the-hungarian-energy-sector/)
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European Union must be extensively vetted and debated on national, intergovernmental, 
and supranational levels. For this reason, Russia has consistently been able to head off at-
tempts by the EU to distance itself from the former. For example, in the late 1990s, the 
US and the European Union were engaged in a joint project to fund a new gas line from 
Turkmenistan across the Caspian Sea through Turkey and into Europe. Perceiving the con-
sequences of this, Russia rushed to build their Blue Stream gas pipeline under the Black Sea 
into Turkey, whose gas market was not large enough to support both pipelines. The Blue 
Stream pipeline was completed in 2002, leaving the EU’s slow and unwieldy bureaucratic 
effort to crumble, the project defunct before construction even began11. 
These and other failures to form a cohesive energy policy have demonstrated that 
cooperation on energy in Europe remains an intergovernmental process rather than a supra-
national one. Consequently, while a secure supply of natural gas is of paramount concern to 
many, a united EU energy policy cannot come about without understanding the motiva-
tions behind its members’ choices with regard to Russia as an energy supplier. 
Methods
This research will assess the fit of a new domestic political economy model and discuss 
the relative stances of four case studies within the larger sample based on their position with-
in the model’s framework. To do this, a nested research design was used, which involves 
establishing patterns among a small sample size (in this case, the 27 EU member states), and 
choosing case studies from the sample that exemplify the comparative points of research and 
thus better assess the observed relationships between variables.
By limiting the sphere of research to countries within the European Union, the pres-
ent research is controlling for as many otherwise confounding variables as possible. States 
within the EU are all bound by the same internal and external trade policies, thus limiting 
the confounding variable of interstate trade regulations. Limiting the scope to EU member 
states also controls for monetary policy due to the Union’s single currency policies, so trade 
values are consistent throughout the measured countries. Alliance is also controlled for, 
since states within the EU have all formally recognized the legitimacy of one another’s gov-
ernments and seemingly reached a positive peace.  Moreover, all EU member states—with 
the exception of Austria—are part of NATO, which controls for much of their foreign 
security policy.
Additionally, for the purpose of limiting variables, natural gas will be the sole energy 
resource examined in this research. Natural gas was chosen over oil (and over a combina-
tion of the two) as the most pertinent energy variable for several reasons. First, natural gas 
pipelines have been at the center of the recent energy disputes that have brought the EU’s 
energy dependence to the forefront of the European political stage. Second, natural gas is 
the most consistent source of electricity and heat throughout the EU, thus impacting the 
survival and wellbeing of most of the European population12. 
11 Baran, Zyeno (2007, 1 October) EU Energy Security: Time to End Russian Leverage
Washington Quarterly, 30(4), pp. 138.
12 Delvaux, B., Hunt, M., & Talus, K. (2008). EU Energy Law and Policy Issues: The Energy Law Research Forum Col-
lection. Lanham, MD: Bernan Press(Pa).
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Economic Factors
There is no doubt that price plays an important role in EU member states’ decisions 
regarding gas suppliers. For some states it is simply not economically feasible to attempt to 
diversify away from Russia should they wish to do so.  The best measure of a state’s ability to 
move away from Russia as their primary supplier of natural gas is to determine the flexibility 
of demand for natural gas in that state. If very flexible—i.e. a sharp rise in price would mean 
a sharp decline in the purchase of natural gas—then one can logically extrapolate that such 
a state could more easily substitute away from Russia and shoulder the burden of extra cost 
in order to gain a steady supply elsewhere. It also implies that Russia’s use of the “energy 
weapon” against such a state would have less of a coercive effect, since that state can more 
easily accommodate a drop in supply.
To measure this, the present research divided the percent change in quantity of natural 
gas demanded by the percent change in price of natural gas between 2005 and 2008. The 
year 2005 was chosen as a starting point since the first Russia-Ukraine pipeline dispute and 
subsequent disruption did not take place until the following year. This means the data is 
current, but unskewed by the aftershocks of the gas crisis. The year 2008 was chosen as its 
comparison because it is the most recent data available at present. As a robustness check, 
this data will be compared to the broader findings of the United States’ Energy Information 
Administration’s 2006 European gas dependence statistics, which were measured based on 
the percentage of Russian natural gas composing total domestic consumption in each state.
Political Factors
The primary political factor utilized in the present research was Eric Gartzke’s Affinity 
of Nations data set, which utilizes Erik Voeten and Adis Merdzanovic’s UN General Assem-
bly Voting data to establish voting trends between state dyads13. Gartzke’s research argues 
that because the gains to be had from voting in the General Assembly are few—many view 
the action as largely symbolic—there is a higher level of honesty in expressing preference. 
The extent of the General Assembly voting records also makes it possible to get broad lon-
gitudinal measures that minimize the effects of short-term variation in political leadership, 
focusing instead on long-term political affinity.
For the present research, voting affinity was averaged for the dyads of each EU mem-
ber state and Russia from 1990 through 2002. 1990 was chosen as an obvious starting point 
because of the impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union on the shaping of Europe and the 
European Union, while 2002 was the most recent data available at present.
As a robustness check and to underscore the political affinity findings based in the Af-
finity of Nations dataset, this research will examine the information collected by the 2009 
Transatlantic Trends group. Previous generations of research have shown public opinion to 
be a well-established link to public policy in democracies14 15.  For this reason, the infor-
mation collected by the 2009 Transatlantic Trends group is both interesting and pertinent. 
Transatlantic Trends surveyed over 11,000 people in eleven European countries—Bulgaria, 
13 Voeten, E. and Merdzanovic, A. (2006)  United Nations General Assembly Voting Data. Accessed October 29, 
2009 from http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/ev42/UNVoting.htm.
14 Erikson, R.S. (1976) The Relationship between Public Opinion and State Policy: A New Look Based on Some 
Forgotten Data. American Journal of Political Science, 20(1), pp. 25-36.
15 Page, B. I. and Shapiro, R. Y. (1983) Effects of Public Opinion on Policy. The American Political Science Review, 
77(1) pp. 175-190.
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France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, and 
The United Kingdom—collecting individual views on their states’ foreign policy, global 
leadership, and other international issues16. 
In analyzing the reasoning behind EU member states’ choice of Russia as an energy 
supplier, the present research will assess the fit of a political economy model and discuss the 
relative position of four case studies within the larger sample based on their positions within 
the model’s framework. In a large-n statistical world, we would generate a large dataset and 
statistically test for correlations among variables. However, the small number of member 
states in the European Union precludes this possibility.  Instead, a variation on Lieberman’s 
synergistic “nested research design” was used. This research and analysis method involves 
using statistical analysis to establish patterns among a small sample size (in this case, the 27 
EU member states). The nested research design process provides direction for case study 
selection, allowing the researcher to choose case studies from the sample that exemplify the 
comparative points of research and thus better assess the observed relationships between 
variables.
Initially, it was anticipated that there might be a direct relationship between the cho-
sen political and economic variables. However, a pair-wise correlation test showed only a 
statistically insignificant weak negative correlation (Pearson’s r = -0.22243). This weak cor-
relation result turned out to be a good thing, since it ensured that the two variables move in-
dependently of one another. Therefore, changes in one factor or the other, or both, would 
affect states in different ways, creating a variety of situations to be examined. See pages 48 
and 49 for the scatter plots of the results, with the median of each dataset delineated.
As previously discussed, the reasons for an EU member state choosing Russia as an 
energy trading partner can be divided into two broad categories: politically- and economi-
cally-motivated.  Looking at the scatter plots, one can see that member states can be divided 
into four quadrants based on their levels of political affinity and economic flexibility. In 
trying to determine which force would prevail given individual circumstances, states’ politi-
cal tendencies were subdivided into either Russophobe or Russophile, and their economic 
dependence was classified based on high versus low price sensitivity. The result was the 
following table:
16 The survey results “can say with 95% confidence that the margin of error attributable to sampling and other 
random effects is plus or minus three percentage points… Europe-wide figures are weighted on the basis of the size 
of the adult population in each country.”
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This table was utilized in choosing case studies, with efforts toward examining four 
states who exemplify each of the four classifications above (Ally, Friend, Customer, and 
Enemy). The present research will endeavor to describe the theoretical reasoning behind 
the choice of each case study, and thereafter give examples of recent instances where these 
economic and political drives have been displayed.
Results
As you can see more closely in Table 1 (page 51), price elasticity of demand was 
calculated for each EU member state, with the exception of Cyprus, Finland, Greece and 
Malta, for whom some or all of the required data was unavailable. The overall mean price 
elasticity of demand was 0.805.  However, this is misleadingly high, as one state—Austria—
constituted an extreme outlier with an elasticity of 8. This is due to the fact that Austria’s 
gas imports—which are quite low—go mainly to industrial, rather than residential, sectors. 
Over 60 percent of Austria’s electricity is produced with hydropower, and 36 percent by 
thermal power production17. Therefore, any drop in natural gas supply causes minimal ef-
fect, while any rise in price causes a drastic drop in demand. If one removes Austria from 
the equation, the new mean European Union price elasticity of demand becomes 0.479, a 
far less flexible rate.
Erik Voeten and Adis Merdzanovic’s Affinity of Nations data was coded as follows: 
1 = “yes” or approval for an issue; 2 = abstain, 3 = “no” or disapproval for an issue18. The 
result is a number that codes values for the data range from –1 (least similar interests) to 1 
(most similar interests). Looking at the data in Table 1, one can see that no dyad falls below 
0.4, but this is to be expected when one takes into account the geographic, economic, and 
historical commonalities and relationships among this group of states. Nevertheless, there is 
still a large degree of variation between EU members with regard to their political affinity 
toward Russia, with some states scoring as high as 0.93 and others as low as 0.45.
To underscore these findings, public survey data from the 2009 Transatlantic Trends 
survey was examined. Though the common perception tends to be of a Russophobic Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe—worried about the bear on their doorstep—and a complacent, 
unconcerned Western Europe that freely trades with its former enemy since capitalism 
bears no grudges19, the most recent popular opinion survey data in the EU contradicts this 
assumption.  When asked “[t]o what extent are you concerned or not about Russia’s role 
as an energy supplier?” 2009 Transatlantic Trends data showed that majorities in all states in 
the EU are “concerned.” While Central and Eastern Europeans were more concerned over 
Russian energy dependence than their Western counterparts—73 percent versus 67 percent, 
respectively—the data showed that citizens in Western states were more upset over their 
increased dependence on Russia as an energy supplier. Overall, Western Europe also saw 
a higher level of anxiety over Russia’s treatment of its neighbors than did the Central and 
Eastern European states that make up Russia’s backyard. These high levels of public alarm 
indicate just how uneasy it makes citizens of the EU to see their own growing dependence 
on Russia, and their fear over the situation’s political implications. 
Within these broad geographic trends, there was even more variation among individ-
17 Energy Use in Austria. Umwelt Bundesamt (Environmental Agency of Austria). Retrieved February 9, 2010, from 
http://www.umweltbundesamt.at/umweltschutz/energie/energie_austria/ [translated by Google]
18 Gartzke, E. (2006). Codebook: THE AFFINITY OF NATIONS INDEX, 1946-2002, Version 4.0, pp. 3.
19 Transatlantic Trends. (2009) “Key Findings 2009.” Transatlantic Trends No. 5, pp 11.
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Table 1 
Price Elasticity % Domestic Consumption Transatlantic Trends 
State' 1Classificationl of Demand that is Russian Gas P i~eline4 Mean Affinil:t: '90-'02 Mean Concern Level (%} 
8' Austria 74 1 0.9 
Belgium 0 8 0 0.87 
Bulgaria (Ally) 0.64 89 1 0.92 
Czech Rep. 0.02 84 0 0.89 7 
Denmark 0 0 0 0.87 
Estonia 0.03 105 0 0.9 5 
France 0.0 1 26 0 0.83 
Germ any (Customer) 0.05 43 1 0.86 
Greece N/A 72 0 0.93 
Hungary 0.04 62 0 0.89 
Ireland 2.18 0 0 0.63 
Italy 0.14 30 0 0.87 
Latvia 0.02 112 1 0.91 5 
Lithuania 0.15 88 1 0.915 
Luxembourg 0.46 N/A 0 0.86 
Netherlands 0.62 9 0 0.86 
Poland 0.08 52 1 0.91 
Portugal 0.7 0 0 0.88 
Romania 1.88 3 23 1 0.92 
Slovaki a (Friend) 0.13 108 1 0.91 7 
Slovenia 0.28 57 0 0.91 6 
Spain 0.65 0 0 0.91 
Sweden 0.03 0 0 0.87 
UK (Enemy) 2.42 0 0 0.45 
' Insufficient data for Cyprus, Finland and Malta 
' Austria's gas goes mainly 10 non-private sectors. In Austria electricity is produced with hydro-power (59%), followed by thermal power production (36%). 
The share of wind energy is around 3%. <http://www.umweltbundesamt.aUenfumweltschutzienergiefenergie_austrial> 
50.66666 
77 
66 
77.33333 
l Th is is a misleadingly high PEoD due to a substantial shift caused by the opening of a sencond nuclear reactor in Romania in 2007, which doubled the amount of electricity 
supplied by nuclear power generation to 18%. resulting in a sudden and dramatic drop in natural gas consumption.<http://www.aecl.ca/NewsRoomiNewsIPress-20071071005.htm> 
• Russian-owned Of dominated gas pipeline. Coded a follows: 1 " has a pipeline passing through or terminating in ; 0 " does not have a pipeline passing 
through. See EtA pipeline map [Attachment I] 
5UN General Assembly Votes only available from 1991 to 2002 
S UN General Assembly Votes only available from 1992 to 2002. 
1 UN General Assembly Votes only available from 1993 to 2002. 
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ual member states. Averaged levels of concern about energy security with regard to Russia 
were calculated using the responses to the three questions asked in the survey: 1) “To what 
extent are you concerned or not about Russia’s role as an energy supplier?” 2) “To what 
extent are you concerned or not about Russia’s behavior toward its neighbors?” 3) “To 
what extent you approve or disapprove of [the idea that] we should reduce our energy de-
pendence on Russia, even if this requires additional investments to acquire different energy 
sources?” As anticipated, the mean levels of concern over energy security with regard to 
Russia appear inversely related to the affinity of nations scores. 
Case Studies
The Ally: Bulgaria
The archetypal “Ally” primarily trades with Russia despite the fact that it could afford 
to diversify natural gas suppliers due to elastic price sensitivity. In addition, the Ally has 
Russophilic policies and positive public opinion toward Russia.  Based on the data collected 
in Table 1 and seen more closely in Table 1.1, one can see that Bulgaria fits both of these 
criteria.
Economically, Bulgaria has a far more elastic demand that most of the European Union 
at 0.64, despite the fact that they get at least 89 percent of their natural gas from Russia20. 
Despite this comparatively high potential for diversification without severe economic dam-
age, Bulgaria has chosen to undertake numerous co-sponsored projects with Russian gas 
companies, some of which undermine their European neighbors’ efforts at diversification.
In addition to the 92 percent alignment with Russia that can be seen in United Na-
tions General Assembly voting patterns, public survey data has served to underline the 
observed affinity between Bulgaria and Russia. In the 2009 Transatlantic Trends survey, 
when asked, “To what extent are you concerned or not about Russia’s role as an energy 
provider?” Bulgarians answered with the second-highest rate of “not concerned” responses, 
at 36 percent. Furthermore, when posited the question, “To what extent are you concerned 
or not about Russia’s behavior toward its neighbors?” 47 percent of Bulgarians responded 
that they were “not concerned”—the highest number of unconcerned responses of any 
country in Europe—with only 40 percent expressing any concern at all (the lowest rate in 
Europe). Finally, when asked “To what extent you approve or disapprove of [the idea that] 
we should reduce our energy dependence on Russia, even if this requires additional invest-
ments to acquire different energy sources?” only 56 percent of Bulgarian citizens approved 
of the idea, marking the lowest rate of approval in Europe by a large margin21. 
The Bulgarian responses to the above questions serve to underscore its placement 
firmly in the camp of “Ally,” which was chosen based on its price elasticity of demand and 
its United Nations Affinity of Nations scores in Table 1. Based on this theoretical classifica-
20 International Energy Data and Analysis for Bulgaria. (2010, January 6). U.S. Energy Information Administration. 
Retrieved January 9, 2010, from http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?fips=BG&Go=Go
21 Romania had the next lowest approval rating at 71 percent.
Table 1.1 
Price Elasticity % Domestic Consumption Mean Transatlantic Trends 
State of Demand that is Russian Gas Pipeline Affinity'90-'02 Mean Concern Level (%) 
Bulgaria 0.64 89 1 0.92 50.66666 
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tion, one would expect to see Bulgaria acting as an Ally by participating in further Russian 
energy projects, despite the availability of other options for diversification, and perhaps even 
to the detriment of other EU member states.
 In keeping with these expectations, Bulgaria is currently jointly developing several 
projects with Russia, including the Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline, which will transport 
Russian oil overland from the Bulgarian Black Sea to the Aegean Sea, bypassing Turkey22. 
On the alternative fuels front, Bulgaria has hired Gazprombank-owned Atomstroyexport to 
build a second nuclear power plan in Belene, Bulgaria, in which the Russian company is 
expected to maintain a majority share23. 
 With regard to natural gas, though Bulgaria is a signatory on the proposed Nabucco 
pipeline project—which is being subsidized by the EU specifically to relieve dependence 
on Russian gas, and involves importing Iranian, Azerbaijani, and Georgian gas via Turkey 
into Europe—it has also signed on to the Russian South Stream pipeline project. The South 
Stream Pipeline was proposed by Russian gas company Gazprom in 2006 and is set to di-
rectly compete with the EU-funded Nabucco Pipeline.
 Despite the fact that Nabucco was proposed much earlier, in 2002, Bulgaria elected 
to sign the preliminary agreement with Russia for the South Stream pipeline in January of 
2008, five months before the Nabucco project came to the table for its transit states. By 
signing on to Russian-backed South Stream, Bulgaria is sending a clear message that regard-
less of its economic ability to substitute away in favor of the EU-sponsored Nabucco, it will 
make the political choice to increase ties with Russia as an energy supplier.
The Friend: Slovakia
 The characteristic “Friend” has inelastic price sensitivity that makes diversification 
away from Russian gas supplies difficult, and maintains Russophilic policies and positive 
public opinion toward Russia. Slovakia fits this mold with very inelastic price elasticity of 
demand at 0.13 and a 108 percent dependence24 on Russia for their natural gas supply, yet 
a 0.91 affinity of nations score—one of the highest.
Interestingly, data from Transatlantic Trends presents a somewhat conflicted picture of 
Slovakian public opinion toward Russia with regard to energy security. Though the ma-
jority of responses indicated a positive public opinion toward close ties with Russia, when 
the Transatlantic Trends Group asked Slovakians, “To what extent are you concerned or 
not about Russia’s role as an energy provider?” 72 percent expressed “concern”—a rate 
higher than the mean European score of 66 percent. The theoretical model presented by 
22 Russia, Bulgaria to discuss joint energy projects in Sophia. (2009, 11 December). EU-Russia Centre. Retrieved 
March 1, 2010 from http://www.eu-russiacentre.org/news/russia-bulgaria-discuss-joint-energy-projects-sophia.
html.
23 Bulgaria May Extend Contract with Russia’s Atomstroyexport. (2010, 23 March). Novinite Sophia News Agency. 
Retrieved March 30, 2010, from http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=114578.ft.
24 Slovakia consistently imports more natural gas than it can consumes and alternatively either sells the surplus to 
neighboring states or stores it in anticipation of shortages.
Table 1.2 
Price Elasticity % Domestic Consumption Mean Transatlantic Trends 
State of Demand that is Russian Gas Pipeline Affinity'90-'02 Mean Concern Level (%) 
Slovakia 0.13 108 1 0.917 66 
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the present research would anticipate a lower than average score for this question. How-
ever, looking at the other survey questions before returning to this one provided context 
for interpreting its meaning.
 In answer to the following question: “To what extent are you concerned or not about 
Russia’s behavior toward its neighbors?” Slovakians had the third-lowest rate of concern 
at 52 percent, and the second-highest number of “not concerned” responses, at 43 percent 
(the highest being Bulgaria). This seems to indicate that, whatever their concerns about 
Russian gas supplies, Slovakians do not feel threatened by Russia in a more general security 
sense.
 Furthermore, when asked, “To what extent you approve or disapprove of [the idea 
that] we should reduce our energy dependence on Russia, even if this requires additional 
investments to acquire different energy sources?” only 74 percent of citizens in Slovakia 
“approve[d].” This was the third-lowest score in Europe, after Bulgaria and Romania, and 
four percent below the European Union average of 78 percent. Still, it did not miss the av-
erage mark by much, perhaps marking the balancing point between feeling minimal threat 
from Russia in a general sense while still favoring a more secure supply source of natural gas. 
 To further understand and underscore Slovakia’s political inclination toward Russia, 
it is helpful to look at questions regarding two other security topics from the 2009 Trans-
atlantic Trends survey. First, when asked, “To what extent you approve or disapprove that 
the European Union provide security assistance for emerging democracies like Ukraine 
and Georgia?” Slovakians had the second lowest number of “approve” responses at only 
55 percent (the lowest approval rating coming from Bulgaria). Furthermore, when asked 
the same question but substituting North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) security 
assistance for EU assistance, Slovakia once again had the second-lowest approval rating at 
only 45 percent—despite Slovakia being a NATO member. While these two questions are 
not gas-related, they deal with another struggle between the European and Russian spheres 
of influence—and, tellingly, Slovakia sides with Russia on both counts.
 To return to the topic of energy, when asked, “To what extent you approve or disap-
prove of [the idea that] we should increase energy cooperation with Russia even if its gov-
ernment is undemocratic?” 65 percent of Slovakians responded that they “approve[d]”—the 
third highest response level and over 10 percent higher than the European average of 52 
percent.
 In keeping with the theoretical model, one would expect to see Slovakia willing to 
increase energy cooperation with any low-cost supplier due to its heavy dependence on 
natural gas and inflexible price elasticity, while perhaps trying to avoid projects which might 
upset Russia. Along these lines, November of 2009 saw Slovakia’s proposal to the Russian 
Energy Ministry for jointly developing a network of underground gas storage facilities in 
Slovakia, for the purpose of securing natural gas supplies for Slovakian citizens in the event 
of another cut in gas supply via Ukraine25. In the same meeting, Slovakia agreed to a change 
in government policy to allow Russia a stake in Slovakia’s domestic gas distribution net-
work. In exchange, Russia agreed to update and extend the Soviet-era Druzhba oil pipeline, 
which runs from Russia into Bratislava, and remains Slovakia’s single largest artery for oil in 
25 Slovakia asks Russia to guarantee uninterrupted gas supplies. (2009, 13 November). EU-Russia Centre. Re-
trieved December 2, 2009, from http://www.eu-russiacentre.org/news/slovakia-asks-russia-guarantee-uninter-
rupted-gas-supplies.html.
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a country 100 percent dependent on Russia for its primary energy.26 27 
 With regard to Nabucco, Slovakia has petitioned for the addition of two pipeline 
interconnectors on the Nabucco project—a connection between Slovakia and Poland, and 
one between Slovakia and Hungary—which would simplify interstate gas transfers and 
make the Nabucco project far more beneficial to Slovakia, despite it not being on the direct 
route of the proposed pipeline28. 
 Collectively, all of these actions demonstrate both the political willingness of Slovakia 
to work with Russia as well as its economic concern with regard to Russia’s dependability as 
a supplier. Slovakia has made it clear that it will pursue the least expensive and most reliable 
gas option, while trying to balance its domestic political ties with both Russia and the EU.
The Customer: Germany
 The model “Customer” would prefer not to trade with Russia for political reasons, 
but economics trump these concerns due to the inelastic price sensitivity. The Customer 
represents those states trying to break free of Russian monopoly of their natural gas market.
 Looking at Table 1.3, one can see that Germany fits well into the Customer mold. 
Despite generating a large percentage of their electricity from domestic coal sources, Ger-
many is the fourth largest natural gas consumer in the world and the second largest import-
er29. As a result of this dependence, Germany has very inelastic price sensitivity of natural 
gas at 0.05 and receives an estimated 43 percent of its natural gas from Russia.
 In alignment with the theoretical model, we can see that Germany’s affinity with 
Russia in the UN General Assembly voting records only extends as far as 86 percent. This 
is particularly interesting given the internal dynamic of Germany as a former Soviet state, 
where tensions still exist between those who favor the old Russian-imposed system and 
those who prefer the present-day liberal democracy30. Despite this, Germany’s affinity hov-
ers below that of the other former Soviet states, and even below that of some of its Western 
neighbors, including France, Austria and Belgium.
 In the 2009 Transatlantic Trends survey, when asked “To what extent are you con-
cerned or not about Russia’s role as an energy provider?” 73 percent of those surveyed 
in Germany said that they were “concerned,” and 31 percent said they were additionally 
“very concerned.” In answer to the question: “To what extent are you concerned or not 
26 OMV May Open Bratislava Link in 2010 to Tap Russia. (2009, 28 May). EU-Russia Centre. Retrieved January 
14, 2010, from http://www.eu-russiacentre.org/news/omv-open-bratislava-link-2010-tap-russia.html.
27 Russia Today. (2009, 17 November). PM meeting cements Russia Slovakia energy ties - RT. RT: Business. Re-
trieved February 20, 2010, from http://rt.com/Business/2009-11-16/pm-meeting-cements-russia.html.
28 Socor, V. (2009, 27 January). A Window of Opportunity for the Nabucco Project at Budapest Meeting. Eurasia 
Daily Monitor, 6(17).  Retrieved March 31, 2010, from http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_
ttnews[tt_news]=34417&tx_ttnews[backPid]=485&no_cache=1.
29 International Energy Data and Analysis for Germany. (2010, January 6). U.S. Energy Information Administration. 
Retrieved January 9, 2010, from http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?fips=GM&Go=Go
30 Jupille, J. (2009, October 23). Cleavages, Party System and Governing Coalitions: Germany, 1. Western European 
Politics. Lecture conducted from University of Colorado at Boulder, Boulder, CO. pp. 15.
Table 1.3 
Price Elasticity % Domestic Consumption Mean Transatlantic Trends 
State of Demand that is Russian Gas Pipeline Affinity'90-'02 Mean Concern Level (%) 
Germany 0.05 43 1 0.86 77 
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about Russia’s behavior toward its neighbors?” 74 percent of German citizens replied that 
they were “concerned”—the second highest rate in Europe, and significantly above the 
European average of 65 percent. Additionally, when asked “To what extent you approve 
or disapprove of [the idea that] we should reduce our energy dependence on Russia, even 
if this requires additional investments to acquire different energy sources?” 84 percent of 
Germans responded that they “approve”—the highest approval rating for this idea in Eu-
rope. Arguably, these answers belie the level of Germany’s political dissatisfaction with their 
energy dependence, marking them once more as a customer beholden to Russia.
 Despite these popular views, Germany’s growing economy demands a great deal of 
energy resources, which is consequentially placing more of the electricity burden on natural 
gas as domestic coal resources are depleted. Caught between a commitment to cut carbon 
emissions by phasing out coal as a primary electrical source and a mandate to shut down all 
nuclear reactors by 2020, Germany may have no choice but to break one of these promises 
or become even more beholden to Russian natural gas until other renewable technologies 
can catch up.
 Based on its position in the theoretical framework, one would expect to see Germany 
trying to diversify away from Russian gas with difficulty, while openly supporting projects 
that would aid in divorcing itself and the EU from Russian gas dependence. At present, 
Germany’s growing economy demands a great deal of energy resources, which is conse-
quentially placing more of the electricity burden on natural gas as domestic coal reserves 
are depleted. Caught between a commitment to cut carbon emissions by phasing out coal 
as a primary electricity source and a mandate to shut down all nuclear reactors by 2020, 
Germany may have no choice but to break one of these promises or become even more 
beholden to Russian natural gas until other renewable technologies can catch up.
 Heavy investment in renewables over the last five years has resulted in an increase in 
the amount of electricity coming from renewable energy in Germany from 6.3 percent in 
2000 to about 15 percent in 2008. But while Germany has made great strides in its renew-
able energy sector—it is the world’s largest wind power generator and the world’s largest 
generator of electricity from non-hydroelectric renewables31—fossil fuels overwhelmingly 
remain the primary source of electricity and broader energy generation, and with that comes 
Russia’s 40 percent and growing role in Germany’s natural gas imports.  
 In order to meet the ever-increasing demand of its citizens, Germany has flexed its 
sovereignty and signed on to several Russian pipeline endeavors, including Nord Stream, 
an offshore natural gas pipeline that will transport Russian gas from Vyborg, Russia through 
the Baltic Sea to Greifswald, Germany—bypassing Ukraine and also states like Poland and 
Belarus that would otherwise receive a portion of any gas passing through their states at 
discounted cost—thus securing a continuous gas supply for the Germans. Germany’s weight 
in the European arena, as well as its central geographic positioning, makes these moves even 
more damaging to its less influential neighbors, which depend on Germany and other allies 
for support in negotiating energy contracts with Russian gas companies.  
 Despite these unilateral endeavors to secure its domestic energy supply, Germany re-
mains one of the most vocal proponents of alternatives to Russian gas. Though outspokenly 
supportive of the Nabucco plan, Chancellor Angela Merkel recently asked the EU not to 
collectively fund the project, since Germany—as the largest economy on the continent—
31 Non-hydro Renewables Data. (2006, 27 September). U.S. Energy Information Administration. Retrieved Novem-
ber 28, 2009, from www.eia.doe.gov/pub/international/iealf/table17.xls.
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would be asked to foot the lion’s share of the bill32. Instead, the Chancellor has suggested 
that the endeavor remain privately funded, citing no lack of corporate investment. Germa-
ny’s own RWE, the second-largest domestic gas and electric company in the country, has 
joined five other energy companies in the Nabucco pipeline consortium. (RWE recently 
announced that it is on the verge of securing a 10 billion cubic meter per year gas contract 
with Turkmenistan, equivalent to one-third of Nabucco’s capacity33). Though not a transit 
country and therefore not a signatory to the project, Germany was represented as an observ-
er for the signing of the intergovernmental transport agreement between Turkey and the 
four EU transit countries—Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania—in Ankara, Turkey34.
The Enemy: the United Kingdom
 The representative “Enemy” has elastic price sensitivity, making diversification much 
easier, coupled with Russophobic policies and a low public regard for Russia. The Enemy 
represents those states trying to remain completely free from Russian monopoly of their 
energy market. Looking at Table 1.4, one can see that the UK fits this mold precisely, with 
very elastic demand and no Russian gas consumption, coupled with the lowest political af-
finity score in the EU and the highest level of concern in the public opinion survey.
 According to the 2009 Transatlantic Trends survey, when asked, “To what extent are 
you concerned or not about Russia’s role as an energy provider?” 76 percent of those sur-
veyed in the UK said that they were “concerned,” and 40 percent moreover identified as 
“very concerned.” This was the second highest level of general concern expressed in Eu-
rope35, and the highest number of “very concerned” responses. Additionally, when posed 
the question, “To what extent are you concerned or not about Russia’s behavior toward its 
neighbors?” citizens in the UK expressed the second-highest level of concern at 74 percent, 
compared to a European mean of 65 percent, with 30 percent of those surveyed adding that 
they were “very concerned.” Finally, when asked, “To what extent you approve or disap-
prove of [the idea that] we should reduce our energy dependence on Russia, even if this 
requires additional investments to acquire different energy sources?” an overwhelming 82 
percent of UK residents responded that they “approve,” with 53 percent adding that they 
“approve very much” (the highest rate expressed in Europe).
 Historically, the UK has utilized its extensive coal reserves for electricity and heat-
ing. However, large leaps in extracting oil and natural gas from its Atlantic Margin gas and 
oil fields led to the “Dash for Gas” in the 1980s and 1990s—in which the UK’s electricity 
32 No EU funding for Nabucco, says Merkel. (2010, 29 January). Euractive. Retrieved April 1, 2010, from http://
www.euractiv.com/en/energy/eu-funding-nabucco-merkel/article-179883.
33 Turkmen gas deal for Nabucco seen in months-RWE exec. (2010, 5 March). Reuters UK.  Retrieved March 31, 
2010 from http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKLDE6241WB20100305?sp=true.
34 Nabucco gas pipeline: new impetus through agreement between transit countries. (2009, 22 July). Wien Interna-
tional.  Retrieved March 31, 2010, from http://www.wieninternational.at/en/node/15135.
35 After Poland, who was directly affected by one of the recent energy cutoffs.
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Table 1.4 
Price Elasticity % Domestic Consumption Mean Transatlantic Trends 
State of Demand that is Russian Gas Pipeline Affinity'90-'02 Mean Concern Level (%) 
UK 2.42 0 o 0.45 77 .33333 
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companies invested heavily in natural gas power plants due to the speed at which they could 
be built relative to coal or nuclear power plants36. Natural gas’ share of electricity produc-
tion rose dramatically, and by 2004 it had overtaken coal as the primary source of electric-
ity generation. Despite currently being the thirteenth largest producer of natural gas in the 
world, the UK faces a growing energy gap as its coal power plants and nuclear stations are 
becoming increasingly outdated.
 Within the present research model’s framework, one would expect to see the United 
Kingdom heavily favor any programs that reduce European dependence on Russian natural 
gas, despite its total lack of dependence on Russia for energy resources. Though geographi-
cally separate from the European continent and largely an unaffected bystander, the UK has 
vocally backed Nabucco. Even so—like Germany—it would prefer not to foot the bill. As 
a coal-rich state, the UK has pushed heavily for increased coal production and consumption 
both domestically and within the EU, touting the fact that coal is an abundant alternative to 
imported natural gas. However, strict EU carbon emissions laws have prevented enthusiasm 
for the idea, despite the UK’s commitment to introducing new carbon capture and storage 
technologies on their domestic power plants. Approximately one-third of the UK’s coal 
plants are expected to close in the next decade due to their inability to meet the standards 
of the European Large Combustion Plant Directive, while many of the nuclear generation 
stations are applying for life-extensions, since their contracts are expected to run out in 
the next decade. In anticipation of this, the UK has begun investing heavily in Liquefied 
Natural Gas (LNG) transport and storage facilities, since unlike pipeline gas, LNG can be 
shipped anywhere, meaning supplier choices are not as limited by proximity and pipeline 
transit capability. While not decreasing overall natural gas dependence, the flexibility of 
LNG transport would make it easier to move away from Russian gas in favor of farther-
flung suppliers. In light of these developments, the UK faces the possibility of needing to 
import natural gas within the next decade if it cannot move toward renewables, and it wants 
to ensure that said gas doesn’t come primarily from Russia.
 The UK’s resolve to act in a sovereignty-driven manner when it comes to energy 
resources was perfectly summed up by Great Britain’s energy minister, Malcolm Wicks, on 
a recent visit to Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, where he discussed the building of a trans-
Caspian pipeline to carry gas to the EU: “Oil and gas issues are not just energy issues; they 
are national security issues for many countries. The EU’s cooperation with countries in the 
[Caspian] region should be seen through the prism of the energy security and national secu-
rity of all states involved in these projects.37” 
Conclusion
 The initial hypothesis that states’ choices would depend on a combination of econom-
ic and domestic political factors—namely the price sensitivity of natural gas in each state and 
its domestic political sentiment with regard to Russia—proved correct based on the model 
presented herein. The European Union, while having proven a successful economic tool for 
its members thus far, has demonstrated time and again its inability to adequately address the 
36 Wheeler, B. (2004, April 22). The politics of power.  BBC NEWS. Retrieved October 20, 2009, from http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/3581637.stm
37 Socor, V. (2007, 25 September). Analysis: Gas discussions in Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan after the Budapest Nabuc-
co conference. Eurasia Daily Monitor.  Retrieved April 1, 2010, from http://politicom.moldova.org/news/analysis-
gas-discussions-in-turkmenistan-azerbaijan-after-the-budapest-nabucco-conference-72989-eng.html.
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issue of energy security, leaving its member states to act in their own self-interest at detri-
ment to the whole.
 In the past, the complex issue of EU energy security had been addressed on both 
purely economic and supranational levels, but it had not hitherto been studied as a com-
bination of domestic economic and political factors. In classifying member states based on 
their individual situations with regard to Russia, the present research was able to construct a 
framework for clearly identifying their present energy relationship with Russia—a tool that 
is essential if the EU ever does want to form a coherent policy toward their primary natural 
gas supplier.
 Recognizing the obstacles facing the European experiment—including the desires of 
each member to retain its sovereignty and build individual power and security—it is neces-
sary for the EU to understand the underlying motivations for its member states’ varying de-
grees of natural gas trade with Russia. Looking to the price sensitivity of natural gas in each 
state and their domestic political sentiment with regard to Russia, one can find compelling 
evidence that these factors play a primary role in determining states’ choices in this arena, 
with the domestic political aspect perhaps even trumping economic considerations. In clas-
sifying member states based on their individual situations with regard to Russia, the present 
research was able to construct a framework for clearly identifying their present energy rela-
tionships with Russia—a tool that is essential if the EU ever does want to form a coherent 
policy toward its primary natural gas supplier.
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